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Changes to the MHRA Raise Burden of Proof and Limit Damages for 
Plaintiffs 
 
By Megan Crowe* 
 
On June 30, 2017, Missouri Governor Eric Greitens signed into law 
Missouri Senate Bill 43 amending the Missouri Human Rights Act 
(“MHRA”). The laws in this bill went into effect on August 28, 2017 and 
have significantly changed the way employment discrimination disputes 
will be handled in Missouri. The bill changed many aspects of 
employment discrimination litigation, including the way plaintiffs may 
bring claims, against whom such claims can be brought, the amount of 
money plaintiffs can recover, and the burden of proof. 
 
There are two highly notable changes this legislation sets in place. The 
first is a cap on damages. The bill now limits plaintiffs’ possible recovery 
to $50,000 in claims against employers with 100 or fewer employees and 
$500,000 in claims against employers with 500 or more employees. The 
second most notable change is a significant increase in the burden of proof 
a plaintiff must meet to prove her claim.  The bill demonstrates significant 
departure from the way employment discrimination cases in Missouri 
state courts have recently been litigated. 
 
For the past ten years, Missouri plaintiffs have enjoyed an extremely low 
burden of proof in employment discrimination cases. In 2007, the Missouri 
Supreme Court decided a case in which a police officer sued for age and 
disability discrimination when he was fired at age 59 after sustaining 
serious injuries resulting in his inability to perform duties on the front line 
but still allowed him to perform supervisory duties.1 The court first noted 
that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment 
discrimination cases.2 The court then analyzed the burden of proof a 
plaintiff must set forth to establish a claim under the Missouri Human 
Rights Act.3 The court focused on the fact that the language in the statute 
states that discrimination includes any unfair treatment on the basis of 
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any protected characteristic.4 Nothing in the statute requires a plaintiff to 
prove discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in the 
employer’s decision.5 “If consideration of age, disability, or other 
protected characteristics contributed to the unfair treatment, that is 
enough.”6 The court also noted that Missouri Approved Instruction 31.24 
uses similar “contributing factor” language.7 The court ultimately held 
that the police officer’s claims should have survived summary judgment 
because it was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age or 
disability were contributing factors in the city’s decision to fire him.8 
 
Subsequently, this contributing factor test was applied widely in Missouri. 
In one case, the court upheld a jury instruction that “the conduct of the 
employer directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage to the 
plaintiff” was proper in an employment discrimination case under the 
MHRA.9 Another case held that it juries should not be instructed on “but 
for” causation for employment discrimination cases.10 The court reasoned 
that because of the language in the MHRA lacks any mention of employer 
conduct being the sole or dominant cause of a plaintiff’s injury, it would 
be error to instruct the jury on proximate causation in these cases.11 
 
While the new legislation seems harsh compared to this precedent, it is 
actually a reorientation, placing Missouri back in line with the federal 
standard and the standard of many other states. In fact, the statute 
explicitly abrogates the holding of Daugherty and other subsequent cases 
and directs courts to apply the burden shifting analysis set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas. 
 
In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court held that in an 
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facie case of racial discrimination.12 Then, the burden is on the employer to 
articulate non-discriminatory reasons for the employee’s rejection.13 
Following that, the plaintiff must have an opportunity to show that the 
employer’s stated reason was in fact pretext or discriminatory in its 
application.14 The test that was derived from this case was called the 
motivating factor test – for a successful employment discrimination claim, 
there must be proof the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected 
and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination.15 
 
Missouri’s reversion to the McDonnell Douglas motivating factor 
standard will greatly benefit employers. Not only will the new law limit 
the amount of damages employers are responsible for on an adverse 
judgment, but it also gives employers a higher level of protection against 
liability to plaintiffs who bring forward frivolous claims based on under-
developed or illusory facts. 
 
On the other hand, plaintiffs wishing to bring employment discrimination 
claims under the MHRA in Missouri state courts may find this change of 
legislation extremely negative. The high burden for proving an MHRA 
claim with the new motivating factor standard, coupled with a damages 
cap limiting recovery creates several problems that will likely have the 
effect of deterring plaintiffs from even pursuing these claims in the first 
place. First and foremost it will make it more difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove and prevail on her claim. While this won’t deter zealous plaintiffs 
who are confident in their case and will go through every means to have it 
heard, it may deter the average individual who does not have the financial 
ability to litigate against a company if they are unsure whether or not they 
will be successful. The trouble and cost of litigating could well be more 
than the case is worth, especially considering the damages cap. 
Considering these factors, plaintiffs may see the legislation as creating an 
adverse legal environment for them. 
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However, the Missouri standard before the change in legislation was 
unique and not the standard practice for employment discrimination 
cases. Federal courts and most states have continued to use the motivating 
factor test since McDonnell Douglas since its inception. Missouri’s change 
in law is not unfair; rather, it is advancing the important policy of 
uniformity in the law. Moreover, this change in law will help eliminate 
forum shopping. Because Missouri’s law is now similar to the laws of 
other states, it will dissuade people from trying to establish jurisdiction in 
Missouri courts in order to increase their probability of a favorable 
judgment when perhaps their claim is not strong enough to prevail 
elsewhere. This not only will allow justice to be administered equally, it 
will help alleviate the ever-growing problem of clogged courts. 
 
The passing of Senate Bill 43 will certainly have a great impact in the way 
employment discrimination cases under the MHRA are tried in Missouri. 
Whether this is a positive or negative impact depends on whether one is 
analyzing it from the employer or the employee perspective. 
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